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Large Shareholders and Firm Risk-Taking Behavior 
 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: 
The largest controlling shareholder (LCS) has various incentives to restrain corporate risk-taking. 
However, other blockholders may have the power to mitigate this distortion, thus resulting in higher 
corporate risk-taking. We investigate whether this is the case using hand-collected ownership data on 
French publicly-listed firms over the period 2003-2007. 
Research Findings/Results: 
We show that the presence of a single LCS is associated with lesser variability in operating 
performance (ROA), market value (Tobin’s Q) and stock returns, especially when the divergence 
between the LCS’s control rights and cash-flow rights is large. In contrast, the presence, number and 
voting power of multiple large shareholders (MLS), other than the LCS, are associated with greater 
variability in firm performance. This effect is found to be concentrated in family-controlled firms.  
Theoretical Implications: 
The results suggest that the LCS has strong incentives to select lower-risk investments in order to 
protect her future extraction of private benefits. However, MLS are found to be effective in preventing 
the LCS from imposing her preference for low-risk projects. By contesting the control of the LCS, 
MLS are confirmed to play an important role in corporate governance. Their monitoring role can be 
viewed as protecting the interests of minority shareholders. 
Practical Implications:  
The LCS may choose to reject value-enhancing risky investments to safeguard her private benefits of 
control. This exposes minority shareholders to potential expropriation problems. Firms with MLS 
display a greater ability to undertake speculative investments, which may explain why they achieve 
higher performance, particularly in family-controlled firms. Equity investors should favor firms in 
which the distribution of control is more balanced.  
 
Keywords: risk-taking, ownership structure, benefit of control, contestability, corporate governance  
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent corporate governance literature highlights the prevalence of closely-held firms 
around the world, especially outside the US and the UK (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 
2002; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). In these firms, 
ownership is typically concentrated in the hands of a few large shareholders whose voting 
power enables them to significantly affect firm decisions and extract private benefits at the 
detriment of small shareholders (Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988). A number 
of empirical studies emphasize the agency costs caused by the largest controlling shareholder 
(LCS). For instance, Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) and Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 
(2002) establish that LCSs tunnel resources out of firms. Other studies examine the impact of 
controlling shareholders on firm values (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002; Cronqvist & 
Nilsson, 2003; Lemmon & Lins, 2003), on the informativeness of the firm’s earnings (Fan & 
Wong, 2002), on information asymmetry and stock liquidity (Attig, Fong, Gadhoum & Lang, 
2006), on the extent of analyst following (Boubaker & Labégorre, 2008), on the costs of 
equity capital and corporate borrowing (Guedhami & Mishra, 2009; Lin, Ma, Malatesta & 
Xuan, 2011). 
Beside the LCS, other blockholders are generally present. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) indicate that about 25% of the firms in their sample of 600 publicly traded 
firms across 27 countries have multiple large shareholders (MLS). Focusing on East Asia, 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that 32.2% of the firms have more than one large 
shareholder. Faccio and Lang (2002) note that 39% of Western European firms have at least 
two blockholders (at the 10% threshold) of which 41% have at least three blockholders. 
Likewise, Laeven and Levine (2008) examine a sample of 1,657 European firms and show 
that 34% have at least two large blockholders. Boubaker (2007) also finds that MLS are 
present in 34% of French publicly-listed firms. These blockholders play an important role in 
the firm’s governance by monitoring the LCS (Bolton & Von Thaden, 1998; Pagano & Roëll, 
1998) and competing for control (Bloch & Hege, 2001).  
A growing number of studies indicate that the presence, number, and voting power of MLS 
have a strong impact on a firm’s performance and financial policies. For instance, Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) and Attig, El Ghoul and Guedhami (2009) establish that MLS are associated 
with higher market values in Finland and East Asia, respectively. Laeven and Levine (2008) 
show that the value of firms with MLS is significantly different from the value of firms with a 
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single LCS, or the value of widely-held firms. Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) note that the 
presence of MLS is associated with higher dividend payouts. Attig, Guedhami and Mishra 
(2008) examine the effect on the firm’s cost of equity. Using data for 1,165 East Asian and 
Western European corporations, their study reveals that the implied cost of equity decreases 
with the presence, number, and voting power of MLS other than the LCS.  
In this paper, we contribute to this line of research by examining the influence of large 
shareholders on corporate risk-taking. We argue that, in the absence of other blockholders, the 
control of the LCS is unimpeded and this generally induces firms to take less risk. One 
argument put forward by John, Litov and Yeung (2008) is that LCSs are likely to be under-
diversified, especially if they represent an individual or a family. Given that most of their 
wealth is tied to the firm, these shareholders will prefer to select prudent strategies even 
though this could undermine the firm’s performance. Maximizing the firm’s value is not a 
prime concern because their objective is not to achieve capital gains, but rather to extract 
private benefits. Another reason to shun risk is that risk-taking increases the probability of 
experiencing a cash shortfall. In that case, the firm may require an increase in capital. But 
being financially constrained, the LCS might have to pass up the share issue, which would 
dilute her stake and possibly weaken her control over the firm. Because control is the main 
objective, the LCS will display a strong propensity to avoid risk. However, other blockholders 
should have a positive influence on the firm’s risk-taking. For instance, institutional investors 
are likely to be more diversified and focused on achieving the highest return on their 
investments. They are also more likely to have deep pockets and would be able to raise their 
stake if necessary. Hence, we expect the presence and voting power of MLS to mitigate the 
negative influence of the LCS on the firm’s risk-taking. As a result, MLS should be associated 
with higher risk.  
Using a hand-collected sample of 2,210 firm-year observations representing 525 French 
publicly-listed firms over the period 2003-2007, we show that excess control, represented by 
the difference between the control and cash-flow rights of the LCS, leads to lower risk-taking. 
This supports the view that the LCS tends to spurn risk out of concern for her future private 
benefits. We also show that corporate risk-taking increases with the presence, number and 
voting power of MLS. In particular, we find evidence of higher volatility in corporate 
performance (measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q and stock returns) when MLS are present. These 
results hold both across and within firms and suggest that MLS play an important monitoring 
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role by counterbalancing the overly conservative behavior promoted by the LCS. For this 
reason, MLS can be viewed as protecting the interests of minority shareholders. 
Our results regarding French firms complement those of Mishra (2011) who examines the 
risk-taking behavior of a sample of firms in East Asia over the period 1996-2005. There are, 
however, a number of key distinctions between French and Asian firms. From a 
macroeconomic viewpoint, growth has been fairly sluggish in Europe over the last decade. 
This has certainly affected the strategies available to French firms and thus their risk-taking 
behavior. From a governance viewpoint, Asian firms are often characterized by extensive 
cross-holdings and ownership by families whose controlling interests span numerous 
industries (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 
1999). Although family control is also pervasive in France, it tends to be concentrated on 
individual firms rather than entire business groups. The control by the LCS is also stronger. 
While the presence of MLS is quite common (Boubaker, 2007), the LCS usually holds a much 
higher share of the votes (Attig, El Ghoul & Guedhami, 2009). Other indicators of power 
concentration such as the Herfindahl index and Shapley value suggest that the control of the 
LCS may not be easily challenged. Yet, our empirical evidence confirms the ability of MLS to 
counter the LCS’s influence on the firm’s risk-taking policy.  
Our findings are more robust for a number of reasons. First, we follow the methodology 
pioneered by Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) and measure risk each year by the absolute 
deviation from the firm’s expected performance (instead of measuring the deviation from the 
firm’s average performance). Second, we use three different measures of performance: return 
on assets, market-to-book value of assets and stock returns. Third, our hand-collected dataset 
allows us to run panel regressions instead of relying on a cross-sectional analysis. Last, but 
not least, our sample period is more representative since it does not involve any major 
financial crisis. In many respects, this is more sensible. In the case of East Asia, the late 1990s 
corresponds to the outbreak of the devastating Asian financial crisis. Inference based on crisis 
periods can be misleading. For instance, risky assets will be found to yield lower returns, 
implying that high risk is associated with lower returns (a statement that is obviously 
incorrect). Extending the tests and providing evidence from a different period and context was 
therefore essential to increase confidence in Mishra’s results. 
Furthermore, we show that the LCS’s negative influence on corporate risk-taking occurs 
primarily in family-controlled firms. This result is unsurprising given the fact that family firm 
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owners are more likely to extract substantial private benefits of control, for example through 
employment of family members and private use of company assets. Family-firm owners also 
tend to be under-diversified since most of their wealth is invested in the company. As a result, 
their incentives to reduce risk-taking are stronger since they would be particularly hard hit by 
the company’s failure (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg & Wiklund, 2007). In addition, family firm 
owners are usually financially-constrained and would find it impossible to provide fresh 
capital to prop up the firm should it experience financial troubles. In that event, the firm 
would need to raise equity externally, thus diluting the shares and weakening the LCS’s grip 
over the firm. However, concerns over control loss have been proved to explain why family 
firms prefer to raise funds using debt rather than equity (Croci, Doukas & Gonenc, 2011) and 
why they also prefer to pay acquisitions in cash rather than exchanging shares (Basu, 
Dimitrova & Paeglis, 2009). It follows that the LCS should be particularly reluctant to select 
risky projects; thus resulting in the family firm’s low-risk profile. In turn, these more 
significant distortions explain why MLS have a greater impact in family firms as opposed to 
non-family firms. 
By documenting the negative influence of the LCS and the positive role played by MLS, 
this study contributes to the existing literature on corporate risk-taking. Prior studies have 
established the influence of managerial ownership (Denis, Denis & Sarin 1997; Chen & 
Steiner, 1999), managerial compensation (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2006; Guay, 1999; 
Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002; Wright, Kroll, Krug & Pettus, 2007), board size (Cheng, 2008; 
Nakano & Nguyen, 2012), CEO power (Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, 2005; Lewellyn & 
Muller-Kahle, 2012), investor protection (John, Litov & Yeung, 2008) and creditor rights 
(Acharya, Amihud & Litov, 2011). Together with Mishra (2011), we add to this line of 
research by showing that MLS are also a key determinant of corporate risk-taking. Our results 
resonate well with other studies documenting the positive effects arising from the presence of 
MLS. For instance, MLS have been shown to enhance corporate valuations (Attig, El Ghoul 
& Guedhami, 2009; Jara-Bertin, Lopez-Iturriaga & Lopez-de-Foronda, 2008; Laeven & 
Levine, 2008; Maury & Pajuste, 2005) and decrease the cost of equity capital (Attig, 
Guedhami & Mishra, 2008). This is not surprising given that MLS play a strong monitoring 
role over the LCS. As a result, the latter is less likely to divert corporate resources and more 
inclined to see them put to their best use (for example, by voting in favor of riskier value-
enhancing projects).  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the link 
between ownership structure and corporate risk-taking. The following section is dedicated to a 
description of the sample. We then present the methodology employed in this study. The next 
section contains the empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
 
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we review the relevant literature and outline the implications arising from 
ownership structures where the LCS has excessive power over minority shareholders. We 
then draw the consequence of the presence of other blockholders (or MLS) with sufficient 
voting power to counter the influence of the LCS.  
 
Risk-Taking with a Single Large Shareholder 
Corporate governance studies show that LCSs can use various mechanisms to separate 
ownership from control, such as pyramiding, cross holdings and dual-class shares (Bebchuk, 
Kraakman & Triantis, 2000). For instance, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that, in 
nine East Asian countries, ultimate owners frequently achieve control in excess of their 
ownership rights through pyramid structures and cross-holdings. Faccio and Lang (2002) 
report a similar result for Western European countries. These mechanisms allow LCSs to 
secure control over a firm despite holding a relatively small fraction of its cash-flow rights. 
Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) argue that this separation creates incentives for LCSs 
to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. Similarly, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) suggest that the main agency problem in publicly 
traded firms stems from the separation between ownership and control of the controlling 
shareholders. The higher the amount of private benefits LCSs can expect to extract, the more 
eager they will be to protect these benefits (John, Litov & Yeung 2008). It follows that LCSs 
are likely to steer corporate investments towards low-risk projects.  
Another argument suggested by John, Litov and Yeung (2008) is that the controlling 
blockholder is likely to be under-diversified. One particular case is when the LCS represents 
an individual or a family. Because most of their wealth is invested in the company, these 
shareholders are reluctant to take risks and strive instead to protect their capital. Faccio, 
Marchica and Mura (2011) show that firms controlled by under-diversified large shareholders 
are likely to select less risky projects compared to diversified large shareholders. Financial 
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institutions represent a different type of large blockholders. These shareholders are clearly 
more diversified and can therefore tolerate a higher degree of risk. However, they are unlikely 
to represent the largest shareholder since their objective is financial (i.e., to obtain a high 
return on their investments) rather than managerial (i.e., to direct the firm’s strategy). As a 
result, LCSs are expected to be characterized by a relatively high level of risk aversion, which 
should be reflected in the firm’s lower risk profile.  
A third reason for expecting a lower propensity to take risk is that LCSs are likely to be 
financially constrained. For instance, family owners must often hold most of their wealth in 
the company in order to retain control. In addition, other control mechanisms, such as the use 
of pyramids and dual-class shares, allow family owners to hold a disproportionate percentage 
of the voting rights despite a relatively low capital commitment. As a consequence, these 
shareholders are expected to be hostile to external equity raisings because this could dilute 
their control considering the fact that they may not be able to contribute the funds to maintain 
their share of voting rights (Croci, Doukas & Gonenc, 2011). To avoid the risk of being 
forced to lose control, they are likely to support low risk corporate policies. Furthermore, 
because the firm will mostly rely on internal cash-flows to fund its investments, it has every 
reason to select low-risk projects to ensure a more stable stream of internal cash-flows. 
Based on the LCS’s under-diversified wealth, financial constraints, and incentives to 
protect her private benefits, the above arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a LCS (no MLS) are characterized by lower corporate risk-taking. 
It is possible in fact to articulate a more precise statement. When the ultimate control and 
cash-flow rights of the LCS are highly divergent, the latter becomes deeply entrenched and is 
more likely to extract large private benefits of control. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and 
Lang (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) show evidence that greater deviations of control 
from cash-flow rights lower firm values in Asian countries. Dyck and Zingales (2004) and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) come to a similar conclusion. The higher the private benefits of 
control, the more eager the LCS will be to protect these benefits (John, Litov & Yeung, 2008). 
In that case, the LCS is expected to tip the firm toward suboptimal risk-taking as a way to 
safeguard her consumption of private benefits. Moreover, the wedge between control and 
cash-flow rights can be viewed as indicating that the financial constraints facing the LCS are 
strongly binding. This also suggests that the LCS has no other sources of funds to alleviate 
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these constraints, which implies that her wealth is under-diversified. From this situation, it 
follows that the wedge between control and cash-flow rights should be negatively related to 
the firm’s risk-taking. We express this idea in our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Greater divergence between the control and cash-flow rights of the LCS is 
associated with lower corporate risk-taking.  
 
Risk-Taking with Multiple Large Shareholders 
The presence of MLS that engage in monitoring activities offers a protection to minority 
shareholders because MLS have both the incentives and power to moderate the diversion of 
corporate resources by the dominant owner (e.g., Bolton & Von Thaden, 1998; Pagano & 
Roëll, 1998; Winton, 1993). Hence, monitoring by MLS is expected to reduce the private 
benefits extracted by the LCS. This idea is supported by studies showing that the presence of 
MLS is associated with higher firm values (Attig, El Ghoul & Guedhami, 2009; Jara-Bertin, 
Lopez-Iturriaga & Lopez-de-Foronda, 2008; Laeven & Levine, 2008; Maury & Pajuste, 
2005). Since minority shareholders are better protected against expropriation, they also 
require a lower return on equity (Attig, Guedhami & Mishra, 2008). 
One way by which the LCS can protect her private benefits of control is by rejecting 
positive net present value (NPV) projects that present a high level of risk. Minority 
shareholders lose out because the return on their capital is not maximized. But the LCS may 
be better off because of a higher aversion to risk (due to her under-diversified wealth) and 
because control offers private benefits that are not shared with other shareholders. Being 
powerless to counter the influence of the LCS, minority shareholders have no means to 
protect their interests but to mark down the firm’s value and require a higher return on their 
equity capital. The presence of MLS shifts the balance of power in their favor and reduces the 
propensity of the firm to select low-risk projects (preferred by the LCS). As a result, the firm 
is more likely to undertake riskier investments that tend to be more valuable. Ultimately, these 
decisions should be reflected in higher corporate values (Attig, El Ghoul & Guedhami, 2009; 
Jara-Bertin, Lopez-Iturriaga & Lopez-de-Foronda, 2008; Laeven & Levine, 2008; Maury & 
Pajuste, 2005). 
Accordingly, the above arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: The presence, number and voting power of MLS are associated with higher 
corporate risk-taking. 
Mishra (2011) tests this hypothesis using a sample of East Asian firms. Because ownership 
is measured in 1996, corporate risk-taking is evaluated over the subsequent 10-year period 
going from 1996 to 2005. The main finding is that MLS induce firms to take more risk. There 
are unfortunately several problems associated with his dataset. The first, and most important 
one, is that the period encompasses the Asian financial crisis. During a crisis, the usual 
relationships dictated by theory tend to break down and are often reversed. For instance, high-
risk investments provide lower returns. Hence, confirming Mishra’s findings using a different 
sample period appears to be necessary. In addition, the Asian financial crisis has triggered a 
significant change in the governance and ownership structure of many firms that have been 
affected. This again pleads in favor of using a more regular period for testing the relationship 
between MLS and risk-taking.  
Nonetheless, Hypothesis 3 appears to be firmly grounded and Mishra’s results may not be 
simply due to his specific sample (or sample period). Nguyen (2012) provides evidence that 
indirectly supports the same outcome. Focusing on the risk-taking of Japanese firms, his 
results indicate that foreign investors lead firms to increase their risk-taking. In this case, 
foreign investors appear to exert a positive influence by challenging the control of Japanese 
financial institutions, which tend to be overly conservative (Weinstein & Yafeh, 1998). 
 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
This section describes the sample selection process and data sources. It also presents the 
method for constructing the ultimate ownership and control variables used in the analysis. 
Finally, the main characteristics of the sample are provided. 
 
Sample Selection 
The initial sample consists of all French listed firms appearing in the Worldscope database 
over the period 2003-2007. We exclude from the sample: (1) financial firms with a two-digit 
SIC code between 6000 and 6999, (2) firms with less than two usable observations for the 
whole sample period, (3) widely held firms where there is no controlling shareholder with 
more than 10% of the voting rights, (4) firms with missing or incomplete ownership, return or 
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financial data. These restrictions result in a final sample of 525 firms and 2,210 firm-year 
observations. Ownership and voting data are taken from the firm’s annual reports. Financial 
data are from Worldscope, stock return, while monthly market returns (SBF 250 index) are 
sourced from Datastream.  
 
Ultimate Ownership and Control Rights of the LCS 
For each firm in our sample, we compute the ultimate cash-flow rights (UCF) and the 
ultimate control rights (UCO) of the LCS as follows. First, we determine the shareholder that 
controls the largest block of direct voting rights. Second, we identify the latter’s direct largest 
shareholder, and we repeat this procedure until reaching the ultimate LCS of each sampled 
firm. LCSs are classified into three types, namely, families, the State and widely held 
corporations and financial institutions (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002). Finally, we 
use all ownership and control chains to compute the ultimate owner’s UCF and UCO. 
Following Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002), we calculate UCO by summing the 
weakest links along the different control chains and using a 10% threshold. UCF are obtained 
by summing the products of direct cash-flow rights along the different ownership chains. 
To illustrate this point, consider a firm B owned directly by another firm A that holds 60% of 
its cash-flow rights and control rights; i.e., OA,B = CA,B = 60% (see, Figure 1). Firm A is itself 
controlled by a family that owns directly 50% of its cash-flow rights and 70% of its control 
rights; i.e., OFamily,A = 50% and CFamily,A = 70%. The family also owns directly 5% (10%) of 
firm B’s cash-flow (control) rights; i.e., OFamily,B = 5% and CFamily,B = 10%. The family is the 
LCS of firm B. Its ultimate cash-flow rights, UCFFamily,B, equals the sum of products of direct 
cash-flow rights along the different ownership chains; that is, UCFFamily,B = (OFamily,A × OA,B) + 
OFamily,B = 35%. Its ultimate control rights, UCOFamily,B, is the sum of weakest links along the 
different control chains; that is, UCOFamily,B = min (CFamily,A ; CA,B) + CFamily,B = 70%. The 
excess control of the family, ECFamily,B, is the difference between UCOFamily,B and UCFFamily,B, 
all divided by UCOFamily,B; that is, ECFamily,B = (UCOFamily,B - UCFFamily,B) / UCOFamily,B = 50%. 
 
Definition of Variables 
We proxy for the degree of separation between the ultimate control and cash-flow rights of 
the LCS using excess control (EXCESS CONTROL). This variable is defined as the 
difference between the LCS’s ultimate control and cash-flow rights, divided by her ultimate 
control rights (i.e., (UCO – UCF) / UCO). Consistent with Attig, Guedhami and Mishra 
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(2008), we define several variables reflecting the presence, number and voting size of MLS. 
The first variable, MLSD, takes the value of one if the firm has at least two large 
shareholders, and zero otherwise. A large shareholder is a legal entity that controls, directly or 
indirectly, at least 10% of the firm’s voting rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2002). We also consider a second variable, MLSN, measuring the number of large 
shareholders, other than the LCS, up to the fourth. To measure control contestability, we use 
the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest blockholders (VR234) and the 
ratio of this sum to the voting rights of the LCS (VRRATIO). To proxy for control dispersion, 
we use the Herfindahl index (HERFINDAHL) calculated as follows: 
     HERFINDAHL = (VR1 – VR2)² + (VR2 – VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)²                     (1) 
where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights of the first, second, third and fourth 
largest shareholders, respectively. Higher values for the index imply a lower control 
contestability of the LCS. 
For each firm, we also compute the following variables: size (SIZE) is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets, growth opportunities (GROPPORT) are measured by capital 
expenditures divided by sales, age (AGE) is equal to the number of years since the firm’s first 
date of incorporation, financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is proxied by the ratio of total debt 
over total assets; and diversification (DIVERSIFICATION) is equal to the number of business 
segments in which the firm operates (using two-digit SIC codes). Appendix A provides the 
definitions and data sources for the variables used in this study. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 2,210 firm-year observations across industries and 
years. Firms in the services and consumer durables industries dominate our sample, 
accounting for 26.06% and 16.70% of the total number of firm-year observations, 
respectively. Petroleum companies make up the smallest proportion of the sample with only 
0.59% of all firm-year observations. Table 1 also shows that firms are evenly distributed 
across the sample period. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the ownership variables and firm characteristics. 
It shows that a significant proportion of all firms exhibit a separation between the UCO and 
UCF of their controlling owners. This separation leads to a mean excess control (EXCESS 
CONTROL) of 20.750% and suggests that firms in our sample are, in general, vulnerable to 
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agency conflicts between the LCS and minority shareholders. MLS are present in almost 38% 
of the firms (2,210 firm-year observations). This finding is consistent with Faccio & Lang 
(2002) who report that 39% of Western European firms have more than one large shareholder 
(at the 10% threshold). For the subsample of firms with MLS (839 firm-year observations), 
the average (median) total voting rights held by the three largest shareholders, beyond the 
LCS, is 26.358% (25.020%). Using the whole sample, we find that the average power of the 
second, third, and fourth largest shareholders, relative to the LCS, is 0.399.  
 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
Consistent with Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) we measure corporate risk-taking by 
the deviation of performance from its expected value. This procedure, commonly known as 
Glejser (1969) heteroskedasticity test, presents the advantage of preserving the panel structure 
of the data. In comparison, the standard deviation of performance used by Cheng (2008) has 
the consequence of collapsing the panel data into a single cross-section. Nevertheless, we 
describe both methods, but use the latter mainly for sensitivity checks. Three measures of 
performance are involved. The first is return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to the book value of assets at the beginning of the year. The second is 
Tobin’s Q, proxied by the market-to-book value of assets. The third measure is represented by 
monthly stock returns.  
 
Glejser Heteroskedasticity Tests 
The procedure involves two steps. The first step requires a model of firm performance in 
order to determine its expected value. For ROA and Tobin’s Q, we consider the following 
models using firm-year observations (the subscripts are dropped for notational convenience): 
ROA = α0 + α1 EXCESS CONTROL + α2 MLSVAR + α3 SIZE + α4 GROPPORT + α5 AGE                                 
                + α6 LEVERAGE + α7 DIVERSIFICATION +   INDUSTRY +   YEAR + u  (2) 
Q = α0 + α1 EXCESS CONTROL + α2 MLSVAR + α3 SIZE + α4 GROPPORT + α5 AGE                    
            + α6 LEVERAGE  + α7 DIVERSIFICATION + α8 ROA+  α9  ROAt-1                                                                
                   +   INDUSTRY +   YEAR + u  (3) 
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MLSVAR equals MLSD, MLSN, VR234, VRRATIO or HERFINDAHL, while INDUSTRY 
(YEAR) denotes a vector of two-digit SIC industry dummies (year dummies). To predict 
monthly stock returns, we use the standard market model: 
R = β M + u (4) 
where M is the return on the market portfolio (proxied by the SBF 250 index).  
In the second step, we run the following regression: 
| û | = γ0 + γ1 EXCESS CONTROL + γ2 MLSVAR + γ3 SIZE + γ4 GROPPORT + γ5 AGE                        
            + γ6 LEVERAGE + γ7 DIVERSIFICATION +   INDUSTRY +   YM + ε  (5) 
where the dependent variable, | û |, is the absolute value of the residuals from equations 2-4. 
Note that when we use the residuals from equations 2-3 (equation 4), the variable YM is a 
vector of year (month) dummies. Equation 5 is estimated using OLS regressions with cluster 
effects at the firm level. We do not use fixed firm effects because, for most firms, ownership 
structure changes slowly over time. In that case, it is likely that the fixed effects estimator 
would fail to detect the influence of excess control and MLS on corporate risk-taking, even if 
it actually exists (Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, 2005; Zhou, 2001).  
 
Within-Firm Performance Variability  
Following Cheng (2008) we define within-firm over-time performance variability as the 
standard deviation of performance for each firm and over the whole sample period. We then 
run the following cross-sectional regression: 
RISKTAKING = α0 + α1 EXCESS CONTROL + α2 MLSVAR + α3 SIZE + α4 GROPPORT  
+ α5 AGE + α6 LEVERAGE + α7 DIVERSIFICATION +   INDUSTRY + u  (6) 
where RISKTAKING is the standard deviation of ROA, Tobin’s Q or monthly stock return 
over the sample period. EXCESS CONTROL is the excess control of the LCS. MLSVAR 
represents MLSD, MLSN, VR234, VRRATIO or HERFINDAHL. All these ownership 
variables are averaged over the sample period. Firm size (SIZE), growth opportunities 
(GROPPORT), firm age (AGE), financial leverage (LEVERAGE) and diversification 
(DIVERSIFICATION) are also averaged over the same period. Older, larger and more 
diversified firms are expected to exhibit lower performance variability. For example, larger 
firms are able to diversify across products and geographic markets; which decreases their 
performance variability. INDUSTRY denotes a vector of industry dummies.  
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RESULTS 
We open this section by carrying out a simple univariate analysis before presenting the 
main results consisting of Glejser heteroskedasticity tests. A number of sensitivity checks 
follow. We complete the analysis by distinguishing family and non-family firms.  
Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the variables in 
the cross-section. As expected, the three indicators of risk-taking measured by the standard 
deviation of ROA, Tobin’s Q and stock returns are strongly correlated. This result indicates 
that firms with more volatile operating profits (ROA) are characterized by more volatile 
market values and stock returns. In turn, the wedge between control rights and cash-flow 
rights (EXCESS CONTROL) tends to be associated with lower risk-taking. However, this 
(negative) correlation does not appear to be highly significant. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is only 
weakly validated by the univariate analysis. On the other hand, the indicators of risk are 
positively correlated with the presence (MLSD), number (MLSN), and voting power of MLS 
(VR234 and VRRATIO) whereas their lack of power to contest the LCS (HERFINDAHL) is 
associated with lower risk-taking. These findings lend preliminary support to Hypothesis 3.  
The correlation between the other variables is consistent with the relationships documented 
in literature. For instance, older firms tend to be larger and more diversified. Larger, older and 
more diversified firms are characterized by significantly lower risk-taking indicators. In 
contrast, firms presenting high-growth opportunities are associated with a higher volatility of 
their performance indicators. Finally, the well-known leverage effect is apparent from the 
significantly higher volatility of stock returns, while the other performance indicators do not 
seem to be more volatile for highly leveraged firms.  
To provide a better sense of the economically significant role played by MLS, Table 4 
displays the difference in risk-taking between firms where MLS are present and have 
sufficient power to contest the preferences of the LCS and firms where MLS are absent or 
have little power. The median value of the relevant variables is used to determine the cut-off 
point. All the results are consistent with the view that MLS contribute to mitigate the 
preference of the LCS for lower risk. For instance, Panel A shows that the average volatility 
of ROA is about 4.85% when the LCS is the only blockholder, but increases to about 6.77% 
when other blockholders are present. Similarly, when the three largest blockholders after the 
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LCS have little voting rights and cannot challenge the LCS the average volatility of ROA is 
about 4.63%. This volatility reaches about 6.90% when these blockholders control a greater 
fraction of the votes and can thus pose a credible challenge to the LCS. All the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Likewise, Panel B and C show that the volatility of Tobin’s Q and monthly stock returns is 
much lower when firms have only one LCS or when the other blockholders control a 
relatively small proportion of the total votes. The average volatility of Tobin’s Q is around 
0.25 in that case, but increases by one third to around 0.34 when MLS are present and control 
a relatively large percentage of the votes. The difference in stock volatility is also statistically 
significant, but comparatively smaller in magnitude with an average monthly stock return 
volatility of about 10% when the LCS is unchallenged and slightly under 12% when the LCS 
must compromise with the other blockholders.  
The comparison of absolute deviation relative to expected performance in Panels D to F 
confirms that firms with a single LCS take significantly less risk while the presence and 
relative power of other blockholders besides the LCS are associated with significantly higher 
risk. For instance, the absolute deviation of ROA is 6.163% when the LCS is the only 
blockholder, but jumps to 7.517% (a 22% increase) when MLS are present. Similarly, the 
absolute deviation of Tobin’s Q increases from 0.315 to 0.394 (a 25% increase) when other 
blockholders are able to contest the influence of the LCS.  
 
Glejser Heteroskedasticity Tests 
The results for Glejser heteroskedasticity tests are reported in separate tables for each 
performance measure. Table 5 shows that when the power of the LCS is unimpeded by the 
presence of other blockholders, firms tend to take significantly less risk as indicated by the 
less significant deviation of ROA from its expected value (or greater predictability in the 
firm’s operating performance). This behavior is in line with hypothesis 1 and supports the 
prediction that the LCS prefers to take less risk because of the private benefits she tries to 
preserve, due to her large under-diversified equity stake or because financial constraints are 
likely to lead to a loss of control in case of a cash shortfall (resulting from a high risk 
strategy). These arguments appear to be supported by the negative coefficient on EXCESS 
CONTROL which captures the wedge between the control and cash-flow rights of the LCS. 
As predicted in hypothesis 2, a large wedge would make the extraction of private benefits 
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more valuable to the LCS and their possible loss all the more undesirable. It follows that the 
LCS has a strong incentive to reduce the firm’s risk-taking.  
By contrast, the results suggest that the absolute deviation of ROA relative to its expected 
value is about 0.9% higher and significant at the 1% level when firms have more than one 
blockholder (regression 1). In comparison, the univariate result displayed in Table 4 indicates 
that the difference is about 1.35%. This implies that the other variables (firm characteristics) 
only explain a small fraction of the difference in the volatility of ROA. The economic 
importance of MLS in monitoring the LCS and enabling a better governance of the firm is 
thus clearly demonstrated.  
The other regressions confirm the role of MLS in determining corporate risk-taking. The 
number of blockholders beside the LCS (regression 2) has a similarly positive effect on the 
volatility of ROA. Likewise, the cumulated votes of the other blockholders (up to the fourth) 
and their relative power (regressions 3 and 4) are seen to be associated with a higher volatility 
of ROA. In contrast, when the concentration of the votes is relatively high (which is likely to 
indicate a strong control by the LCS) the level of risk is significantly lower. 
The control variables have generally the effects predicted by theory and found in most 
empirical studies. Consistent with Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), Cheng (2008) and 
Mishra (2011), larger firms are characterized by significantly lower volatility of operating 
profits. However, the number of business segments has little impact, possibly because the 
diversification effect on risk is already captured by firm size. Firms with higher growth 
opportunities usually display a higher volatility of operating profits due to the high level of 
uncertainty associated with their investments. In contrast, older firms display greater 
predictability in their operating performance which is also the case of US firms (Adams, 
Almeida & Ferreira, 2005; Cheng, 2008). 
Table 6 presents the results of Glejser heteroskedasticity tests using Tobin’s Q as indicator 
of performance. Compared to the results with ROA, the coefficients on the ownership 
variables tend to exhibit higher statistical significance and all they have the anticipated signs. 
Regression 1 demonstrates that the absence of MLS leads necessarily to lower risk-taking 
with a difference of about 6.5%. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the coefficients on EXCESS 
CONTROL − indicating a greater control by the LCS relative to her actual ownership − is 
significantly negative. Thus the greater stability in operating performance apparent in the 
previous table is confirmed with an even greater predictability in the firm’s market value. This 
suggests that investors are sensibly factoring the incentives for the LCS to decrease the firm’s 
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risk profile as well as the actual reduction in the firm’s earnings (ROA) variability. However, 
the presence of other blockholders beside the LCS contributes to increase the volatility of the 
firm’s market value. This is consistent with the prediction articulated in hypothesis 3 that 
MLS encourage firms to take greater risks (thus the higher volatility in their market values).  
The other conclusions derived from the predictability of operating performance (ROA) are 
confirmed using Tobin’s Q. A higher percentage of voting rights in the hands of other 
blockholders (regression 3), especially relative to the voting rights of the LCS (regression 4), 
is associated with a lower predictability in firm value. In contrast, the lack of power of MLS 
to contest the LCS’s stranglehold on the firm’s policy (regression 5) results in a more 
predictable firm value, suggesting that the LCS is successful in reducing the firm’s risk-
taking. As in the previous table, the predictability of the firm’s market value is seen to 
decrease with the firm’s size, but to increase with its growth opportunities. Leverage is also 
found to increase the unpredictability in the value of French firms in contrast to the US where 
leverage appears to have an insignificant effect (Cheng, 2008) or to decrease the volatility of 
Tobin’s Q (Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, 2005). 
In Table 7, we turn our attention to the predictability of stock returns (conditional on the 
market’s realized return and the firm’s fitted beta). The results are consistent with those 
reported for the two previous performance measures. The absence of other blockholders 
appears to allow the LCS to push the firm to take less risk. The incentive to decrease risk is 
strongly related to the divergence between the control and cash-flow rights (EXCESS 
CONTROL) of the LCS. Either because this wedge leads to a lower volatility of earnings (or 
their greater predictability) or because investors are able to anticipate the incentives for the 
LCS to make the firm pursue low risk projects, the firm’s stock returns end up being much 
more predictable (using the market model). Again, the presence of another blockholder is 
associated with significantly higher deviation of stock returns. This indicates that stock 
returns are less predictable and supports the assumption that the presence of MLS prevents 
firms from reducing their risk-taking.  
 
Robustness Tests 
We test the robustness of our results by running several sensitivity checks. First, we use a 
cross-sectional approach (equation 6) to relate the standard deviation of ROA, Tobin’s Q and 
stock returns to the average ownership and firm characteristics calculated over the same 
period. This so-called within-firm over-time performance variability approach is primarily 
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used by Cheng (2008). The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with Glejser 
heteroskedasticity tests.1 In essence, the presence and voting power of MLS are associated 
with higher performance volatility. For instance, ROA volatility is 1.65% higher when other 
blockholders are present. In comparison the univariate tests point to a difference of 1.92%. 
Hence, most of the difference in volatility due to the presence of MLS cannot be explained 
away by other firm characteristics. Likewise, the volatility of Tobin’s Q is found to be 7.78% 
higher when firms have more than two blockholders. Again, the difference of about 9% 
indicated by a simple univariate comparison demonstrates that MLS have a material impact 
on corporate risk-taking.2  
In a second test, we construct an index of contestability of the LCS’s power using principal 
component analysis (PCA). The index is a linear combination of the five MLS proxies used in 
this study. Its purpose is to aggregates the individual MLS variables into a single factor that 
better captures the general influence of MLS. In our case, PCA generates only one factor with 
an eigenvalue greater than 1. The eigenvalue equals 3.729 and explains 74.60% of total 
variance. Columns 1-3 in Table 8 reveal that the constructed index enters positively and 
significantly at the 1% level in all of the regressions. This result confirms the strong 
connection between MLS and corporate risk-taking. Another proxy for the contestability of 
the LCS is the Shapley value. We define the variable Shapley1 as the Shapley value solution 
for the largest controlling shareholder in a four shareholder voting game where the four 
largest blockholders are individual players and the rest are considered as an “ocean”. The 
relation between this variable and the proxies of corporate risk-taking is expected to 
be negative. Columns 4-6 in Table 8 show that the Shapley value enters negatively and 
significantly at the 1% level in all the regressions. Hence, the results provide additional 
evidence that higher contestability of the LCS’s voting power by MLS is associated with 
higher corporate risk-taking. 
We then address the potential endogeneity problem due to reverse causality between 
ownership structure and risk-taking. Previous research suggests that the ownership structure 
depends on the firm’s valuation and contracting environment. For example, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) argue that that the domestic legal environment affects the 
ownership structure of firms. Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p.1155) underscore that “the structure 
of corporate ownership varies systematically in ways that are consistent with value 
maximization.” Moreover, large shareholders may prefer to invest in low-risk firms with the 
view, for instance, of correcting their deviations from optimal risk-taking. Following 
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Cheng (2008), we address this potential endogeneity concern by running cross-sectional 
regressions using each firm’s first valid observation over the whole period 2003-2007 for all 
the independent variables (EXCESS CONTROL, MLSVAR, AGE, SIZE, LEVERAGE, 
GROPPORT, and DIVERSIFICATION). By using this approach, we mitigate concerns that 
the variability of corporate risk-taking could foreshadow changes in the ownership structure 
variables. The (untabulated) results confirm the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on EXCESS CONTROL. The coefficients for MLSD, MLSN, VR234 and 
VRRATIO (HERFINDAHL) are positive (negative) and significant at the 1% level. These 
findings suggest that endogeneity is not a serious concern and that causation is more likely to 
run from ownership structure to firm performance variability.3 
Finally, we check that the results are robust to the exclusion of regulated utilities (SIC 49). 
For these firms, the risk-taking levels, the profitability and the valuation can be influenced by 
government regulations and European Union directives rather than by agency issues. But 
again the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
Difference between Family and Non-Family Firms 
The traditional agency conflict between managers and shareholders caused by differing 
managerial objectives is resolved in the case of family firms by the fact that family members 
are in charge of the firm’s decision making.4 On the other hand, the conflicts of interests 
between family owners and other shareholders are likely to be amplified (Jara-Bertin, Lopez-
Iturriaga & Lopez-de-Foronda, 2008; Maury & Pajuste, 2005). One significant point of 
divergence involves the optimal level of risk-taking. As the LCS, family owners have strong 
incentives to decrease the firm’s risk even though a higher level of risk would increase the 
firm’s value. The reason for this suboptimal choice is because a failure of the company (as a 
consequence of higher risk-taking) would disproportionately hurt the family given that most 
of its wealth is typically invested in the firm’s capital (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Faccio, 
Marchica & Mura, 2011).  
Since personal and business matters can be difficult to tell apart in family firms, family 
owners have greater incentives to indulge in the consumption of perquisites whose costs are 
mainly borne by other shareholders. A type of private benefits frequently extracted by family 
members is employment at lucrative conditions. The protection of such private benefits 
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implies that family owners will urge the company to adopt a lower risk profile, including if 
necessary by passing up valuable but risky investment opportunities.  
In addition, family owners are likely to be financially constrained. The use of dual-class 
shares and pyramids is a reflection of their desire to strengthen their control without providing 
a large amount of the firm’s capital. In fact, these control enhancement mechanisms are used 
to allow family owners to relax their financial constraints. At the same time, the situation 
suggests serious restrictions to their ability to contribute further capital to support the firm’s 
growth. Because of their reluctance to surrender control by opening up the firm’s capital to 
outside investors, family owners develop a preference for debt financing (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Croci, Doukas & Gonenc, 2011).  However, this choice implies that family firms have 
to select lower risk projects to maintain their debt capacity and comply with possible loan 
restrictions.  
Furthermore, family owners are likely to recognize that in case the firm should experience 
a significant cash shortfall, they might be not be in a position to provide a backstop. This may 
thus put the firm at risk of failure or compel the firm to raise capital externally, which would 
dilute the family’s ownership and potentially result in their loss of control (Du and Dai, 2005). 
Again, this argument suggests that the incentives for family owners to shun risk should be 
particularly strong.  
By their presence and voting power, other blockholders may be able to resist the family’s 
preferences for low risk investments. This is especially true if these blockholders are large 
institutions characterized by a diversified asset portfolio (Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 2011). In 
that case, risk is unlikely to enter the objective function but is more likely to represent one of 
the variables employed for maximizing return on investment. Hence, the greater the deviation 
from optimal risk-taking induced by family owners, the greater the opportunity for other 
blockholders to correct the deviation and lead firms toward higher risk-taking. Overall, we 
can expect Hypotheses 1-3 to strongly apply to the case of family firms.  
In non-family firms, the LCS is generally a financial institution (e.g., investment bank or 
private equity firm). Due to their more diversified portfolios, these shareholders are not 
particularly concerned about taking risk, which is selected for its ability to generate optimal 
returns. Cash shortfalls arising from adverse risky outcomes can be offset by gains in other 
portfolio investments and are not feared as much as in family firms where they might lead to 
ruin or induce a loss of control. As a result, the LCS’s impact on the firm’s risk-taking is 
expected to be weak to indeterminate in non-family firms. In other words, deviations from 
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optimal risk-taking should not be systematically observed in relation to the presence of a LCS. 
It follows that other blockholders have little or no systematic opportunity to modify the firm’s 
risk-taking behavior. Hence their influence on corporate risk-taking should also be weak to 
indeterminate.  
To test the above predictions, we separate family and non-family firms in two groups. 
Family firms are identified as having a family as the LCS. Table 9 compares their mean 
values for the ownership variables and firm characteristics. Excess control is visibly higher in 
family firms (21.2% against 17.3%), which is consistent with the fact that family owners face 
financial constraints and are hence more likely to use control enhancing mechanisms to relax 
these constraints. Other blockholders are less likely to be present in family firms (37.1% 
against 41.7%), but the difference is not statistically significant. However, the large 
concentration of voting rights in the hands of the LCS combined with the weaker presence of 
other blockholders lead to a significantly higher Herfindahl index (0.29 against 0.16) in 
family firms. The performance indicators (ROA, Tobin’s Q and stock returns) are not 
systematically different across the two groups. On the other hand, family firms are clearly 
smaller and less diversified, and exhibit lower rates of capital expenditures.  
In Table 10, we evaluate the influence of MLS on the three risk-taking indicators (i.e. the 
absolute deviation from expected firm performance) for family and non-family firms. To 
conserve space, we only present the results for the variable (MLSD) indicating the presence of 
other blockholders since the results for the other variables (MLSN, VR234, VRRATIO and 
HERFINDAHL) convey a similar message.  
In all the regressions, the coefficient on excess control is negative and highly significant 
for family firms, but indistinguishable from zero for non-family firms. The coefficient on 
MLSD is also systematically positive and significant for family firms, but close to zero for 
non-family firms. Taken together, the results suggest that the incentives to decrease risk arise 
primarily in family firms and could be exacerbated by financial constraints and larger private 
benefits of control (as indicated by a greater use of control enhancement mechanisms). 
However, the presence of other blockholders helps to mitigate this bias toward less risk-taking 
and is associated with a significant increase in risk. For instance, the absolute deviation of 
ROA is 1.07% higher when family firms have multiple blockholders.  
In contrast, the presence of other blockholders appears to have no effect on the volatility of 
performance in non-family firms. This result seems to originate from the fact that the LCS 
does not restrain the firm’s risk-taking behavior. Indeed, while the LCS tends to hold control 
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rights in excess of her cash-flow rights, this wedge is not associated with lower risk-taking 
because the LCS is not particularly under-diversified or financially-constrained as the LCS in 
family firms. Hence, other blockholders may not detect a specific need to intervene on the 
firm’s risk-taking policy and therefore reveal a systematic pattern through their presence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The presence of MLS is believed to promote better governance (Bloch & Hege, 2001; 
Bolton & Von Thaden, 1998; Pagano & Roëll, 1998) and to increase firm value (Attig, El 
Ghoul & Guedhami, 2009; Jara-Bertin, Lopez-Iturriaga & Lopez-de-Foronda, 2008; Laeven 
& Levine; 2008; Maury & Pajuste, 2005). The exact mechanism by which MLS enhance firm 
performance is, however, not clearly established. The conventional view is that MLS prevent 
the LCS from diverting corporate resources for her own benefit. Tunneling of cash-flows and 
related party transactions are typical examples, especially in emerging markets where the rule 
of law is often poorly enforced (Bae, Kang & Kim, 2002; Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis, 2006).  
One way by which the LCS can divert corporate resources from their best use is by 
dissuading the firm to undertake high-risk projects despite the fact that these projects tend to 
be more valuable. Minority shareholders suffer from this inefficient allocation of resources. 
But the LCS can better protect her control of the firm and therefore the stream of private 
benefits she can derive from her controlling stake (John, Litov & Yeung, 2008). The presence 
of MLS helps to thwart this plan and is assumed to result in higher corporate risk-taking.  
In this paper, we show that this is well and truly the case by examining a large sample of 
French listed companies over the period 2003-2007. When MLS are absent or in a weaker 
position, operating performance, market value and stock returns are both much more 
predictable, indicating that firms are selecting low-risk projects. In contrast, the presence and 
voting power of MLS is found to result in less predictable performance, consistent with the 
selection of high-risk investments. The difference in risk is not only statistically significant, 
but also economically large. For instance, the average deviation from the firm’s expected 
market value is found to be up to one third larger when MLS are present in the firm’s 
ownership structure.  
By challenging the LCS’s preference for low-risk projects and impeding her attempts to 
guide the firm toward more conservative policies, MLS play an important role which might 
explain why their presence and voting rights are associated with higher market value and why 
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investors are more willing to invest in these firms, as indicated by their lower cost of equity 
capital (Attig, Guedhami & Mishra, 2008). Our results complement those recently provided 
by Mishra (2011) for East-Asian firms. However, our sample period is not contaminated by 
the crisis that has swept through East Asia in the late 1990s. Further research should also shed 
more light on the type of corporate decisions that are more precisely affected by the presence 
of MLS.  
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FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example of ultimate cash-flow (UCF) rights and ultimate control (UCF) rights calculations in a three-tier 
pyramid. Oi,j (Cij) indicates the direct cash-flow (control) rights of entity i in entity j. In this figure, the family is 
the largest (ultimate) controlling shareholder of firm B. Its ultimate cash-flow rights UCFFamily,B equals the sum of 
products of direct cash-flow rights along the different ownership chains; i.e., UCFFamily,B = (OFamily,A × OA,B) + 
OFamily,A = 35%. Its ultimate control rights UCOFamily,B is the sum of weakest links along the different control 
chains; i.e., UCOFamily,B = min (CFamily,A ; CA,B) + CFamily,B= 70%. The excess control of the family is the difference 
between UCFFamily,B  and UCOFamily,B, all divided by UCOFamily,B; i.e., ((UCOFamily,B – UCFFamily,B) / UCOFamily,B) = 
50%. 
 
 
O Family, A = 50%; C Family, A = 70% 
O A, B = C A, B = 60% 
Family 
Firm A 
Firm B 
O Family, B = 5%; C Family, B = 10% 
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of sample firms across industries and years 
 
      Total 
Industry (SIC codes) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Number per 
industry 
Percentage  
of total  
Petroleum  
(13, 29) 
2 2 3 3 3 13 0.59 
Consumer durables  
(25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57) 
67 75 75 78 74 369 16.70 
Basic industry  
(10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33) 
41 44 42 47 41 215 9.73 
Food and tobacco  
(1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54) 
29 29 29 28 26 141 6.38 
Construction  
(15, 16, 17, 32, 52) 
22 22 21 20 18 103 4.66 
Capital goods  
(34, 35, 38) 
47 49 45 47 44 232 10.50 
Transportation  
(40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47) 
8 10 10 13 12 53 2.40 
Utilities  
(46, 48, 49) 
17 19 23 29 27 115 5.20 
Textiles and trade  
(22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59) 
54 55 51 49 41 250 11.31 
Services  
(72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89) 
105 111 120 129 111 576 26.06 
Leisure  
(27, 58, 70, 78 , 79) 
30 31 30 27 25 143 6.47 
Total number per year 422 447 449 470 422 2,210 100.00 
Percentage of total 19.09 20.23 20.32 21.27 19.09 100  
 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of the 2,210 sample firm-year observations across industries and years, based on 
Campbell’s (1996) industrial classification. Financial firms (SIC 60-69) are excluded. The industries are petroleum (SIC 13, 
29), consumer durables (SIC 25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57), basic industry (SIC 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33), food and tobacco 
(SIC 1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54), construction (SIC 15, 16, 17, 32, 52), capital goods (SIC 34, 35, 38), transportation (SIC 40, 41, 42, 
44, 45, 47), utilities (SIC 46, 48, 49), textiles and trade (SIC 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59), services (SIC 72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 82, 
87, 89) and leisure (SIC 27, 58, 70, 78, 79). 
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TABLE 2 
Summary statistics for ownership structure variables and firm characteristics 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. 25th 
percentile
Median 75th 
percentile 
Max. 
Panel A: Ownership structure variables 
   EXCESS CONTROL (%) 2,210 20.750 20.547 -25.104 1.330 17.845 31.716 93.421 
   MLSD (N(MLSD=1) = 839) 2,210 0.379 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
   MLSN 2,210 0.469 0.662 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000 
   VR234 (%) 839 26.358 9.619 10.000 19.360 25.020 33.500 46.860 
   VRRATIO 2,210 0.399 0.508 0.000 0.000 0.196 0.609 2.175 
   HERFINDAHL 2,210 0.272 0.251 0.000 0.057 0.195 0.428 0.906 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
   Stock returns 24,757 0.016 0.103 -0.248 -0.038 0.003 0.059 0.425 
   Market returns  24,757 0.011 0.034 -0.063 -0.011 0.017 0.031 0.127 
   ROA 2,210 5.934 11.390 -40.665 2.230 6.791 11.324 38.130 
   Tobin’s Q 2,210 0.491 0.687 -2.950 0.321 0.668 0.915 1.270 
   AGE 2,210 42.961 32.465 1.000 17.000 29.000 72.000 100.000 
   LEVERAGE 2,210 0.216 0.166 0.000 0.072 0.198 0.325 0.721 
   Total Assets (€ billion) 2,210 2.224 7.391 0.004 0.039 0.134 0.606 50.550 
   GROPPORT 2,210 0.060 0.111 0.000 0.014 0.030 0.057 0.805 
   DIVERSIFICATION 2,210 2.746 1.487 1.000 2.000 2.000 4.000 8.000 
 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the ownership structure variables (Panel A) and firm charcteristics (Panel 
B). EXCESS CONTROL is the excess control of the largest controlling shareholder. MLSD is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm has at least two large shareholders, and zero otherwise. MLSN is the number of large shareholders, other than 
the largest controlling shareholder (LCS), up to the fourth. VR234 is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth 
largest shareholders. VRRATIO is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest blockholders divided by the 
voting rights of the LCS. HERFINDAHL equals the sum of squared differences between the voting rights of the four largest 
shareholders, that is, (VR1 - VR2)² + (VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)²; where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights 
of the first, second, third and fourth largest shareholders, respectively. ROA is return on assets, measured by the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of assets at the beginning of the year. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market to 
book value of assets. The firm’s age (AGE) is measured by the number of years since its first date of incorporation and 
capped at 100 years. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt over total assets. GROPPORT is the firm’s 
capital expenditures divided by sales. DIVERSIFICATION is the number of business segments. For each variable, the table 
provides the number of firm-year observations (N), the mean (Mean), the standard deviation (S.D.), the minimum (Min.), the 
25th percentile, the median (Median), the 75th percentile and the maximum (Max.). 
 
 
 
 TABLE 3 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between variables 
 
 S.D. of 
ROA 
S.D. of 
Tobin’s Q 
S.D. of 
returns 
EXCESS 
CONTROL 
MLSD MLSN VR234 VRRATIO HERFINDHA
L 
SIZE GROPPORT AGE LEVERAGE DIVERSIFICATIO
N 
S.D. of ROA 1.000 0.456** 0.580** -0.037 0.168** 0.169** 0.192** 0.179** -0.160** -0.466** -0.104* -0.288** -0.074† -0.212** 
S.D. of Tobin’s Q 0.488** 1.000 0.336** -0.015 0.181** 0.179** 0.214** 0.196** -0.167** -0.326** -0.064 -0.304** -0.249** -0.206** 
S.D. of returns 0.569** 0.346** 1.000 -0.062 0.153** 0.181** 0.213** 0.184** -0.214** -0.477** -0.194** -0.374** 0.023 -0.238** 
EXCESS CONTROL -0.096* -0.058 -0.114** 1.000 0.177** 0.228** 0.212** 0.250** -0.293** 0.058 -0.091* -0.011 0.035 -0.007 
MLSD 0.187** 0.167** 0.124** 0.177** 1.000 0.976** 0.825** 0.741** -0.466** -0.212** -0.070 -0.262** -0.117** -0.184** 
MLSN 0.177** 0.163** 0.147** 0.191** 0.893** 1.000 0.850** 0.770** -0.487** -0.225** -0.083† -0.265** -0.093* -0.192** 
VR234 0.226** 0.180** 0.161** 0.206** 0.825** 0.822** 1.000 0.935** -0.617** -0.202** -0.081† -0.306** -0.076† -0.213** 
VRRATIO 0.228** 0.192** 0.172** 0.239** 0.676** 0.711** 0.864** 1.000 -0.764** -0.150** -0.066 -0.345** -0.056 -0.221** 
HERFINDAHL -0.176** -0.155** -0.160** -0.252** -0.490** -0.475** -0.626** -0.696** 1.000 0.011 0.055 0.331** 0.051 0.142** 
SIZE -0.412** -0.282** -0.427** 0.069 -0.191** -0.209** -0.202** -0.129** -0.006 1.000 0.275** 0.380** 0.309** 0.396** 
GROPPORT 0.127** 0.126** 0.178** -0.054 -0.046 -0.035 -0.050 -0.047 0.105* -0.039 1.000 0.207** 0.265** 0.177** 
AGE -0.236** -0.216** -0.281** 0.012 -0.169** -0.165** -0.193** -0.212** 0.163** 0.337** 0.013 1.000 0.164** 0.433** 
LEVERAGE 0.048 -0.038 0.189** 0.029 -0.006 0.000 -0.008 -0.029 0.004 0.053 0.049 0.027 1.000 0.160** 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.204** -0.163** -0.189** 0.004 -0.168** -0.162** -0.218** -0.232** 0.143** 0.403** 0.053 0.378** 0.056 1.000 
 
Notes: This table reports Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) correlation between the regression variables used in the cross sectional regressions (model 6). The 
sample consists of 525 nonfinancial French listed firms over the period 2003-2007. S.D. of ROA, S.D. of Tobin’s Q and S.D. of stock return are the standard deviations, over the sample period, 
of ROA, Tobin’s Q and monthly stock return. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of assets at the beginning of the year. Tobin’s Q is the market to book value 
of assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. All the other variables are averaged over the sample period. EXCESS CONTROL is the excess control of the largest controlling 
shareholder. MLSD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least two large shareholders and 0 otherwise. MLSN is the number of large shareholders, other than the largest controlling 
shareholder (LCS), up to the fourth. VR234 is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest shareholders. VRRATIO is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth 
largest blockholders divided by the voting rights of the LCS. HERFINDAHL is the sum of squared differences between the control rights of the four largest shareholders, that is, (VR1 - VR2)² + 
(VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)²; where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights of the first, second, third and fourth largest shareholders, respectively. Firm age (AGE) is the number of 
years since the firm’s first date of incorporation. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt over total assets. GROPPORT is capital expenditures divided by sales. 
DIVERSIFICATION is the number of business segments. **, * and † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 TABLE 4 
Difference in risk-taking by degree of contestability of the LCS 
 
 Mean Median 
Low 
MLSVAR  
High 
MLSVAR  
t-statistic  Low 
MLSVAR  
High 
MLSVAR  
z-statistic 
Panel A: Standard deviation of ROA 
   MLSD 4.857 6.776 -4.310** 3.314 4.628 -3.790** 
   MLSN 4.956 6.776 -4.045** 3.314 4.628 -3.804** 
   VR234 4.635 6.899 -5.152** 3.171 4.651 -4.068** 
   VRRATIO 4.752 7.143 -5.346** 3.314 4.701 -3.806** 
   HERFINDAHL 6.446 4.663  3.960** 4.629 3.315  3.538** 
Panel B: Standard deviation of Tobin’s Q 
   MLSD 0.251 0.340 -3.890** 0.177 0.259 -4.166** 
   MLSN 0.255 0.341 -3.695** 0.175 0.259 -4.253** 
   VR234 0.256 0.329 -3.228** 0.177 0.231 -3.377** 
   VRRATIO 0.256 0.343 -3.746** 0.168 0.231 -3.874** 
   HERFINDAHL 0.323 0.245  3.343** 0.225 0.179  2.841** 
Panel C: Standard deviation of stock return 
   MLSD 0.102 0.118 -3.319** 0.085 0.103 -3.793** 
   MLSN 0.103 0.117 -2.883** 0.085 0.103 -3.784** 
   VR234 0.100 0.119 -4.158** 0.085 0.104 -4.496** 
   VRRATIO 0.101 0.121 -4.067** 0.085 0.103 -4.246** 
   HERFINDAHL 0.117 0.099  3.754** 0.104 0.085  4.534** 
Panel D: Absolute value of ROA residuals 
   MLSD 6.163 7.517 -5.289** 4.510 5.181 -4.106** 
   MLSN 6.159 7.503 -5.266** 4.526 5.152 -4.141** 
   VR234 6.023 7.474 -5.809** 4.324 5.243 -5.066** 
   VRRATIO 6.161 7.500 -5.202** 4.435 4.993 -3.055** 
   HERFINDAHL 7.120 5.952  4.628** 5.151 4.201  4.886** 
Panel E: Absolute value of Tobin’s Q residuals 
   MLSD 0.315 0.394 -6.312** 0.254 0.320 -6.233** 
   MLSN 0.319 0.390 -5.694** 0.262 0.312 -5.161** 
   VR234 0.318 0.380 -5.125** 0.250 0.310 -5.420** 
   VRRATIO 0.322 0.387 -5.076** 0.251 0.308 -5.254** 
   HERFINDAHL 0.369 0.302  5.418** 0.296 0.257  4.311** 
Panel F: Absolute value of stock return residuals 
   MLSD 0.059 0.064 -8.145** 0.046 0.050 -6.719** 
   MLSN 0.059 0.064 -8.118** 0.046 0.050 -6.742** 
   VR234 0.058 0.064 -9.699** 0.044 0.049 -8.043** 
   VRRATIO 0.059 0.064 -7.387** 0.045 0.049 -6.764** 
   HERFINDAHL 0.063 0.058  8.134** 0.049 0.045  7.353** 
 
  
Notes: This table compares the mean and median of the risk-taking proxies by degree of contestability of the LCS defined by 
a value for the variable(s) MLSVAR above or below the median. MLSVAR equals MLSD, MLSN, VR234, VRRATIO or 
HERFINDHAL. MLSD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least two large shareholders and 0 otherwise. 
MLSN is the number of large shareholders, other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS), up to the fourth. VR234 is 
the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest shareholders. VRRATIO is the sum of voting rights of the 
second, third and fourth largest blockholders divided by the voting rights of the LCS. HERFINDAHL equals the sum of 
squared differences between the voting rights of the four largest shareholders, that is, (VR1 - VR2)² + (VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - 
VR4)²; where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights of the first, second, third and fourth largest shareholders, 
respectively. ROA is return on assets. Tobin’s Q is the market to book value of assets. In panels A, B and C, the risk-taking 
proxies are the standard deviations, over the sample period, of ROA, Tobin’s Q and stock return. The MLS variables are 
averaged over the sample period. In panels D, E and F, the risk-taking proxies are the absolute values of the residuals from 
equations 2-4. ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 TABLE 5 
Influence of control contestability on deviation from expected ROA 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
EXCESS CONTROL -1.34885* 
(-2.271) 
-1.38961* 
(-2.330) 
-1.39601* 
(-2.361) 
-1.39404* 
(-2.325) 
-1.72393** 
(-2.913) 
MLSD 0.89402** 
(3.358) 
    
MLSN  0.62467** 
(3.102) 
   
VR234   3.98867** 
(3.881) 
  
VRRATIO    0.94053** 
(3.292) 
 
HERFINDAHL     -2.82110** 
(-5.332) 
SIZE -0.57598** 
(-8.612) 
-0.57398** 
(-8.540) 
-0.57922** 
(-8.673) 
-0.60365** 
(-9.047) 
-0.66069** 
(-10.198) 
GROPPORT 0.10037** 
(3.307) 
0.10016** 
(3.306) 
0.09841** 
(3.278) 
0.09144** 
(3.081) 
0.09499**       
(3.512) 
AGE -0.00930** 
(-4.276) 
-0.00931** 
(-4.284) 
-0.00911** 
(-4.193) 
-0.009** 
(-4.288) 
-0.00913** 
(-3.245) 
LEVERAGE   0.51184 
(0.811) 
0.46887 
(0.727) 
0.52176 
(0.803) 
0.60110 
(0.911) 
0.50664 
(0.979) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.14813 
(-1.137) 
-0.14856 
(-1.140) 
-0.13365 
(-1.023) 
-0.08662 
(-0.670) 
-0.13220 
(-1.011) 
Intercept 
 
 12.14576** 
(11.570) 
12.22465** 
(11.563) 
11.88940** 
(11.307) 
12.30400** 
(11.718) 
14.32499** 
(13.424) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 
Adjusted-R² 0.117 0.116 0.118 0.112 0.119 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute deviation of ROA from the value predicted by Equation 2. ROA is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of assets at the beginning of the year. EXCESS CONTROL is the excess 
control of the largest controlling shareholder. MLSD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least two large 
shareholders and 0 otherwise. MLSN is the number of large shareholders, other than the largest controlling shareholder 
(LCS), up to the fourth. VR234 is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest shareholders. VRRATIO is 
the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest blockholders divided by the voting rights of the LCS. 
HERFINDAHL equals the sum of squared differences between the voting rights of the four largest shareholders, that is, 
(VR1 - VR2)² + (VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)²; where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights of the first, second, 
third and fourth largest shareholders, respectively. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm age (AGE) is the 
number of years since the firm’s first date of incorporation. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is total debt over total assets. 
GROPPORT is capital expenditures over sales. DIVERSIFICATION is the number of business segments. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are computed with standard errors clustered by firm. **, * and † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 6 
Influence of control contestability on unexpected firm value measured by Tobin’s Q 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
EXCESS CONTROL -0.11523** 
(-4.115) 
-0.11122** 
(-3.966) 
-0.10631** 
(-3.754) 
-0.12422** 
(-4.380) 
-0.13552** 
(-4.794) 
MLSD 0.06543** 
(5.166) 
    
MLSN  0.03733** 
(4.027) 
   
VR234   0.19611** 
(3.959) 
  
VRRATIO    0.06293** 
(4.578) 
 
HERFINDAHL     -0.15924** 
(-6.061) 
SIZE -0.02837** 
(-8.242) 
-0.02851** 
(-8.863) 
-0.02916** 
(-8.403) 
-0.02970** 
(-8.687) 
-0.03295** 
(-9.823) 
GROPPORT 0.00636** 
(4.106) 
0.00647** 
(4.101) 
0.00645** 
(4.129) 
0.00601** 
(3.915) 
0.00661** 
(4.297) 
AGE 0.00006 
(0.530) 
0.00005 
(0.450) 
0.00004 
(0.372) 
0.00006 
(0.510) 
0.00001 
(0.103) 
LEVERAGE 0.06632 
(1.429) 
0.06331 
(1.290) 
0.06590 
(1.322) 
0.06524 
(1.278) 
0.05964 
(1.207) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.01051 
(-1.515) 
-0.01190† 
(-1.726) 
-0.01072† 
(-1.549) 
-0.01000 
(-1.451) 
-0.00939 
(-1.360) 
Intercept 
 
0.66942** 
(12.731) 
0.68948** 
(13.248) 
0.68013** 
(12.967) 
0.70141** 
(13.730) 
0.80499** 
(15.782) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 2,210 
Adjusted-R² 0.127 0.122 0.120 0.124 0.132 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute deviation of Tobin’s Q relative to its predicted value given by Equation 3. 
EXCESS CONTROL is the excess control of the largest controlling shareholder. MLSD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm has at least two large shareholders and 0 otherwise. MLSN is the number of large shareholders, other than the largest 
controlling shareholder (LCS), up to the fourth. VR234 is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest 
shareholders. VRRATIO is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest blockholders divided by the voting 
rights of the LCS. HERFINDAHL equals the sum of squared differences between the voting rights of the four largest 
shareholders, that is, (VR1 - VR2)² + (VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)²; where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights 
of the first, second, third and fourth largest shareholders, respectively. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm age 
(AGE) is the number of years since the firm’s first date of incorporation. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is total debt over 
total assets. GROPPORT is capital expenditures over sales. DIVERSIFICATION is the number of business segments. The t-
statistics in parentheses are computed with standard errors clustered by firm. **, * and † denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 TABLE 7 
Influence of control contestability on unexpected stock returns 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
EXCESS CONTROL -0.00477** 
(-3.012) 
-0.00561** 
(-3.535) 
-0.00542** 
(-3.407) 
-0.00652** 
(-4.043) 
-0.00754** 
(-4.641) 
MLSD 0.00293** 
(4.271) 
    
MLSN  0.00334** 
(6.146) 
   
VR234   0.01613** 
(5.700) 
  
VRRATIO    0.00546** 
(6.948) 
 
HERFINDAHL     -0.01281** 
(-8.944) 
SIZE -0.00322** 
(-19.413) 
-0.00315** 
(-18.884) 
-0.00318** 
(-19.169) 
-0.00326** 
(-19.763) 
-0.00351** 
(-21.078) 
GROPPORT -0.00003 
(-0.487) 
-0.00004 
(-0.551) 
-0.00004 
(-0.538) 
-0.00004 
(-0.590) 
-0.00003 
(-0.474) 
AGE -0.00004** 
(-7.584) 
-0.00004** 
(-7.504) 
-0.00004** 
(-7.569) 
-0.00004** 
(-7.447) 
-0.00004** 
(-7.470) 
LEVERAGE 0.01088** 
(6.234) 
0.01073** 
(6.194) 
0.01084** 
(6.271) 
0.01069** 
(6.218) 
0.01084** 
(6.209) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.00020 
(-0.574) 
-0.00017 
(-0.497) 
-0.00017 
(-0.489) 
-0.00013 
(-0.369) 
-0.00020 
(-0.572) 
Intercept 
 
0.09129** 
(32.630) 
0.09036** 
(32.277) 
0.08977** 
(31.685) 
0.09145** 
(32.958) 
0.09997** 
(34.810) 
Month dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 24,757 24,757 24,757 24,757 24,757 
Adjusted-R² 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.053 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute difference between the firm’s realized return and the return predicted by the 
market model outlined in Equation 4. EXCESS CONTROL is the excess control of the largest controlling shareholder. 
MLSD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least two large shareholders and 0 otherwise. MLSN is the number 
of large shareholders, other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS), up to the fourth. VR234 is the sum of voting 
rights of the second, third and fourth largest shareholders. VRRATIO is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and 
fourth largest blockholders divided by the voting rights of the LCS. HERFINDAHL equals the sum of squared differences 
between the voting rights of the four largest shareholders, that is, (VR1 - VR2)² + (VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)²; where VR1, 
VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights of the first, second, third and fourth largest shareholders, respectively. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since the firm’s first date of incorporation. Financial 
leverage (LEVERAGE) is total debt over total assets. GROPPORT is capital expenditures over sales. DIVERSIFICATION is 
the number of business segments. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed with standard errors clustered by firm. **, * 
and † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 
 TABLE 8 
Robustness check using a contestability index obtained by principal component analysis and the Shapley value as proxy for contestability of control of the LCS 
 
 Absolute value of  
ROA residuals 
Absolute value of 
Tobin’s Q residuals 
Absolute value of  
stock return residuals 
 Absolute value of  
ROA residuals 
Absolute value of 
Tobin’s Q residuals 
Absolute value of  
stock return residuals 
Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
EXCESS CONTROL -1.59868** 
(-2.698) 
-0.12562** 
(-4.350) 
-0.00651** 
(-4.031) 
 -0.89194 
(-1.566) 
-0.10428** 
(-3.717) 
-0.00477** 
(-3.033) 
Contestability index 0.30080
**(4.598) 0.01806** 
(5.665) 
0.00129** 
(7.509) 
    
Shapley1     -1.59348** 
(-4.360) 
-0.08032** 
(-4.462) 
-0.00921** 
(-9.289) 
SIZE -0.58925** 
(-9.041) 
-0.02907** 
(-9.152) 
-0.00320** 
(-18.601) 
 -0.70359** 
(-10.864) 
-0.03232** 
(-10.133) 
-0.00358** 
(-20.580) 
GROPPORT 0.09571** 
(3.519) 
0.00628** 
(4.741) 
-0.00004 
(-0.587) 
 0.10089** 
(3.757) 
0.00669** 
(5.062) 
-0.00004 
(-0.651) 
AGE -0.00888** 
(-3.141) 
0.00006 
(0.477) 
-0.00004** 
(-6.597) 
 -0.00981** 
(-3.513) 
0.00005 
(0.405) 
-0.00004** 
(-6.551) 
LEVERAGE 0.51672 
(0.993) 
0.06688** 
(2.638) 
0.01081** 
(7.722) 
 0.50428 
(0.981) 
0.05625* 
(2.222) 
0.01018** 
(7.272) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.12333 
(-0.938) 
-0.00923 
(-1.441) 
-0.00014 
(-0.406) 
 -0.05646 
(-0.435) 
-0.01287* 
(-2.014) 
-0.00029 
(-0.838) 
Intercept 
 
12.59155** 
(11.977) 
0.70499** 
(13.759) 
0.08855** 
(29.289) 
 14.99973** 
(13.339) 
0.82739** 
(14.938) 
0.10141** 
(30.901) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2,210 2,210 24,757  2,210 2,210 24,757 
Adjusted-R² 0.119 0.128 0.061  0.119 0.125 0.062 
 
Notes: This table shows the results using a contestability index and the variable Shapley1 as alternative proxies for the control contestability of the largest controlling shareholder (LCS). The 
contestability index is the common factor extracted from the variables MLSD, MLSN, VR234, VRRATIO and HERFINDAHL using principal component analysis. Shapley1 is the Shapley 
value solution for the largest controlling shareholder in a four shareholder voting game. ROA is return on assets. Tobin’s Q is the market to book value of assets. EXCESS CONTROL is the 
excess control of the largest controlling shareholder. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since the firm’s first date of incorporation. Financial 
leverage (LEVERAGE) is total debt over total assets. GROPPORT is capital expenditures divided by sales. DIVERSIFICATION is the number of business segments. **, * and † denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 TABLE 9 
Summary statistics for family and non-family firms 
 
 Family firms  Non-family firms  Test of difference 
 N Mean 
(A) 
 N Mean 
(B) 
 (B) – (A) t-statistic 
Panel A: Ownership structure          
   EXCESS CONTROL (%) 1,886 21.241  324 17.303  -3.938 -2.988** 
   MLSD  1,886 0.371  324 0.417  0.046 1.442 
   MLSN 1,886 0.459  324 0.520  0.061 1.420 
   VR234 (%) 699 26.734  140 25.110  -1.624 -1.961† 
   VRRATIO 1,886 0.370  324 0.471  0.101 2.623** 
   HERFINDAHL 1,886 0.290  324 0.160  -0.130 -8.255** 
Panel B: firm charcteristics         
   Stock return 21,298 0.016  3,459 0.016  0.000 0.164 
   Market return 21,298 0.012  3,459 0.012  0.000 -0.047 
   ROA 1,886 6.101  324 4.938  -1.163 -1.567 
   Tobin’s Q 1,886 0.496  324 0.454  -0.042 -0.905 
   AGE 1,886 43.404  324 38.933  -4.471 -2.278* 
   LEVERAGE 1,886 0.215  324 0.216  0.001 0.079 
   Total Assets (€ billion) 1,886 1.509  324 9.633  8.124  12.252** 
   GROPPORT 1,886 0.044  324 0.056  0.012   3.677** 
   DIVERSIFICATION 1,886 2.705  324 2.942  0.237 2.409* 
 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the ownership structure variables (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel 
B) for family and non-family firms. The mean comparison tests between family firms and non-family firms are indicated in 
the last column. EXCESS CONTROL is the excess control of the largest controlling shareholder. MLSD is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm has at least two large shareholders, and zero otherwise. MLSN is the number of large shareholders, 
other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS), up to the fourth. VR234 is the sum of voting rights of the second, third 
and fourth largest shareholders. VRRATIO is the sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest blockholders 
divided by the voting rights of the LCS. HERFINDHAL equals the sum of squared differences between the voting rights of 
the four largest shareholders, that is, (VR1 - VR2)² + (VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)²; where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal 
the voting rights of the first, second, third and fourth largest shareholders, respectively. ROA is return on assets, measured by 
the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of assets at the beginning of the year. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
market to book value of assets. The firm’s age (AGE) is measured by the number of years since its first date of incorporation. 
Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt over total assets. GROPPORT is the firm’s capital expenditures 
divided by sales. DIVERSIFICATION is the number of business segments. **, * and † denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
  
TABLE 10 
Influence of multiple blockholders on corporate risk-taking in family and non-family firms 
 
 Deviation in ROA   Deviation in Tobin’s Q   Deviation in stock returns  
 Family Non-family  Family Non-family  Family Non-family 
Independent variable (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
EXCESS CONTROL -1.29211* 
(-2.001) 
-0.96815 
(-0.677) 
  -0.13711** 
(-4.298) 
-0.01547 
(-0.223) 
  -0.00391* 
(-2.197) 
0.00129 
(0.272) 
MLSD   1.07626** 
(3.917) 
0.79953 
(1.231) 
   0.06502** 
(4.790) 
-0.03089 
(-0.958) 
    0.00273** 
(3.715) 
0.00030 
(0.155) 
SIZE  -0.59821** 
(-7.926) 
 -0.73853** 
(-4.611) 
  -0.02465** 
(-6.610) 
 -0.03286** 
(-4.571) 
   -0.00341** 
(-17.016) 
 -0.00354** 
(-7.495) 
GROPPORT  0.08723** 
(2.974) 
0.05511 
(0.811) 
  0.00556** 
(3.842) 
0.00638† 
(1.788) 
 -0.00005 
(-0.628) 
 0.00058* 
(2.371) 
AGE -0.00585† 
(-1.801) 
0.00187 
(0.296) 
     -0.00003 
(-0.197) 
    -0.00009 
(-0.404) 
     -0.00004** 
(-5.009) 
    -0.00005** 
(-3.623) 
LEVERAGE 0.82564 
(1.531) 
1.20571 
(0.662) 
  0.09029** 
(3.389) 
-0.09056 
(-1.023) 
   0.01010** 
(6.894) 
  0.02057** 
(3.352) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.17368 
(-1.241) 
0.23153 
(0.619) 
 -0.00985 
(-1.424) 
0.01595 
(0.838) 
 -0.00045 
(-1.191) 
-0.00077 
(-0.610) 
Constant  11.87644** 
(10.132) 
  10.22807** 
(3.300) 
    0.64877** 
(11.203) 
   0.43670** 
(3.992) 
    0.09026** 
(26.803) 
   0.08358** 
(9.193) 
Fixed effects 
included 
Year; 
Industry 
Year; 
Industry 
 Year; 
Industry 
Year; 
Industry 
 Year; 
Industry 
Year; 
Industry 
Sample size 1886 324  1886 324  21,298 3459 
Adjusted-R² 0.109 0.207  0.111 0.261  0.060 0.075 
F-value   11.521**   4.844**    11.703**   5.690**    42.827**   9.221** 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute deviation of performance relative to its expected value. Performance is 
measured by ROA (columns 1-2), Tobin’s Q (columns 3-4), and stock returns (columns 5-6). EXCESS CONTROL is the 
excess control of the largest controlling shareholder. MLSD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least two 
large shareholders and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since 
the firm’s first date of incorporation. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is total debt over total assets. GROPPORT is capital 
expenditures over sales. DIVERSIFICATION is the number of business segments. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
computed with standard errors clustered by firm. **, * and † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
  
Appendix A: Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition Source 
RISKTAKING Standard deviation of ROA, Tobin’s Q or monthly stock returns, 
calculated over the whole sample period. ROA is the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to the book value of assets. Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio of market to book value of assets. 
Worldscope, 
Datastream and 
authors’ calculations 
EXCESS CONTROL Excess control of the largest controlling shareholder. Excess control (at 
the 10% threshold) is the ratio of the difference between the LCS’s 
ultimate control rights (UCO) and ultimate cash-flow rights (UCF), to 
the ultimate control rights (i.e., (UCO – UCF) / UCO). 
Annual reports and 
authors’ calculations 
MLSD Dummy that equals one if the firm has at least two large shareholders, 
and zero otherwise. A large shareholder is a legal entity that controls, 
directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the firm’s voting rights (La Porta 
et al., 2002). 
Authors’ calculations 
MLSN Number of large shareholders, other than the LCS, up to the fourth. Authors’ calculations 
VR234 The sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest 
shareholders. 
Authors’ calculations 
VRRATIO The sum of voting rights of the second, third and fourth largest 
blockholders divided by the voting rights of the LCS. 
Authors’ calculations 
HERFINDAHL The sum of squared differences between the voting rights of the four 
largest shareholders, i.e., 
(VR1 - VR2)² + (VR2 - VR3)² + (VR3 - VR4)² 
where VR1, VR2, VR3 and VR4 equal the voting rights of the first, 
second, third and fourth largest shareholders, respectively. 
Authors’ calculations 
AGE Number of years since the first date of incorporation. Authors’ calculations 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. Worldscope 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt over total assets. Worldscope 
GROPPORT Capital expenditures divided by sales. Worldscope 
DIVERSIFICATION Number of business segments (using 2-digit SIC codes). Authors’ calculations 
 
  
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 We also re-estimate Equation 6 using median regressions to mitigate the impact of outliers. The signs and the 
degrees of significance of the independent variables are not affected. 
2 In addition, we reproduce the results of the cross-sectional regressions using industry-adjusted ROA, Tobin’s Q 
and market-adjusted stock return as dependent variables. Industry-adjusted ROA (Tobin’s Q) is the difference 
between the firm’s ROA (Tobin’s Q) and the industry ROA (Tobin’s Q) in the same year. The latter is defined as 
the median ROA (Tobin’s Q) of all firms with the same two-digit SIC code. Market-adjusted stock return is the 
difference between the firm’s monthly stock return and the return on the SBF 250 index. The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. We also use the CAC 40 index as proxy for the market portfolio (instead of the SBF 
250) and find that this does not materially affect our results. 
3 A better control for endogeneity would require the use of instruments, that is to say variables uncorrelated with 
the risk-taking proxies, but highly-correlated with the MLS variables. Despite our best efforts, such instruments 
could not be identified. 
4 Furthermore, controlling families have a solid track record of ensuring management loyalty (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2000). Hence, even in family firms with professional managers (who are not family members), the 
agency conflict between management and shareholders is less likely to exist. 
 
